On 4 August 1914 Great Britain declared war on the German Reich. The formal casus belli was the German violation of Belgian neutrality, although the government's decision for war was ultimately determined by calculations about the need to preserve a European 'balance of power' (believed to be essential to the safety of Britain and her empire) against what the Foreign Office saw as a German attempt to achieve military and political hegemony in Europe.
1 Whatever the diplomatic and military considerations that had led to its outbreak many Britons, and particularly many on the political left, came to regard the war as a profound ideological struggle. It was seen, in the words of the radical MP Richard Lambert, as 'a fight for Liberty against Bureaucracy, for British ideals and for Liberalism in its widest sense against Prussian Militarism and Tyranny '. 2 As this book has shown, however, militarism was never simply a 'Prussian' phenomenon. By 1914 it had taken root within British politics and society too, albeit in a rather different form from that which supposedly characterized the German Empire. British militarism was in many ways a remarkably ambiguous -even a paradoxical -phenomenon. 'Militaristic' values were undoubtedly present in Edwardian British culture, although popular attitudes towards war and towards the professional soldiery were complex and contested. The pre-war British army was small and politically subordinate to the civilian authorities, although military officers were certainly not excluded from positions of political power and influence -particularly in the wider reaches of the empire -and soldiers serving outside mainland Britain often appeared to enjoy considerable freedom of action which the civilian authorities at Westminster could not always easily constrain. Wider British society was not militarized by any bureaucratic system of universal military conscription, yet many thousands of Britons would have welcomed the introduction of compulsory service, and many thousands more participated voluntarily in military activities and undertook military training without enlisting in the regular army. In terms of spending on armaments and military preparation, Britain was one of the most heavily militarized states in Europe.
Many on the British left were deeply troubled by these trends. But those who talked of a profound and absolute incompatibility between militarism and progressive politics did not speak for the left as a whole. Within the 'political class', at least 120 Liberal and Labour MPs who sat in the House of Commons between 1902 and 1914 had either served in the armed forces or joined one of the militaristic pressure groups clamouring for ever greater resources to be devoted to the cause of national defence. Many MPs fell into both categories. The NSL under Lord Roberts failed to convince a majority on the British left to support its campaign for the introduction of compulsory military service but, under the auspices of a Liberal administration, Richard Haldane as secretary of state for war controversially pursued his own vision of a 'nation-in-arms'. Some socialists argued that the Liberal Party's apparent failure to resist the rising tide of militarism in the years before 1914 demonstrated that the party of Gladstone had forfeited its mantle as the standard-bearer of progressive politics. 3 Yet those, such as the ILP chairman W. C. Anderson, who attempted to enshrine anti-militarism as a central principle of wider Labour politics in Britain found that many of their comrades did not share their commitment. One local Labour Party secretary, responding to a communication distributed as part of the ILP's campaign against militarism in 1910, declared, 'I do not know whether my committee consider there is any connection between antimilitarism and Socialism. I will ask them.' 4 The arguments provoked by the SDF's support for compulsory training in a 'citizen army' revealed how far British socialists were from agreement even as to what constituted 'militarism'. But the SDF's agenda also revealed the extent to which seemingly militaristic ideas could be reshaped as radical, even revolutionary, 'progressive' policies.
The attitude of the British left towards militarism in the early twentieth century was thus uncertain and ambivalent. Indeed, those on the left who came to assimilate or embrace 'militaristic' ideas by 1914 represented several distinct traditions. The revolutionary socialist advocates of a citizen army had little in common with the 'moderate' Liberals who supported the Navy League. By almost any measure the latter group were more 'right-wing' than the SDF, although the fidelity of Liberal navalists
